What a Trump or Harris Administration Will Mean for the Mideast | Opinion

As the United States prepares for elections, the world holds its breath. Given Washington’s global importance and the vastly different outlooks of the candidates, U.S. allies and enemies alike must prepare not only for two different Americas, but two different worlds. Nowhere is this more so than in the Middle East.
The stakes couldn’t be higher. The Middle East seems to be at a crossroads. Either the region will further embroil itself in the radical, toxic, and revolutionary ideologies that have caused so much anguish over the last century, or it will embrace a path to tolerance, stability, and prosperity. In the first camp are Iran, Turkey, Qatar, Palestinian groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and the many terrorist organizations that occupy the region. In the latter, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, the Kurdish Regional Government and Israel.
As the countries of the region seek to navigate these choppy waters, the U.S. elections will likely determine their strategy.
To be sure, both Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump share the same end goal for the region, which is disengagement. Following two unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and with the desire to pivot towards China, both candidates understand that an over-involved United States in the region is both unpopular and would lead to less available resources to be allocated east.
But that end goal is the candidates’ only commonality.
Harris has shown no signs she would break from the Obama-Biden strategy for the region, which shifted the balance of power toward Iran. Both attempted to pacify Iran with economic incentives, non-enforcement of sanctions and political concessions.
The logic behind such policy is that the Islamic Republic is here to stay and so it is better to help facilitate its ascendance through appeasement than fight its influence. That’s why Obama didn’t intervene as Iran and Russia split Syria or when Iran turned Iraq into a vassal. He would later say that Saudi Arabia and Iran have to “share the neighborhood.”
Such policy led to and will continue to lead to a weakened U.S. presence in the region and force traditional allies like the Gulf States, Jordan and Egypt to seek security guarantees elsewhere – namely Russia and China.
Trump presidency on the other hand is a bit harder to predict. For Trump, a lot of his policy depends on the advisers around him. But if his policy will be as it was during his first term, it would mean a hard line on Iran and an expansion of the Abraham Accords without undermining them by forcing concessions to the Palestinians. Such policy could lead to the formation of an anti-Iranian regional coalition including Israel guaranteed by the United States.
Such a coalition could not only deter and contain Iran but could empower the countries of the region to do so themselves, allowing Washington to manage from afar.
But before the countries of the region achieve the needed security independence to defend themselves, it is key that the United States fills the gaps. During his first term, Trump didn’t fully understand this. After Iran likely attacked Norwegian, Emirati and Saudi ships off of the UAE, Trump failed to respond. When Iran attacked Saudi strategic oil facilities later that year, he again took no action.
To his credit however, Trump restored deterrence in 2020 with the elimination of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. The assassination led to a significant decline in Iranian proxy activity in the region.
Yet if Trump inconsistently deters, Obama-Biden-Harris don’t deter at all. President Barack Obama famously said that if Syrian President Bashar al-Asad used chemical weapons on his own people , it would be a “red line.” When Asad killed 1,400 in a rebel-held area of Damascus with sarin gas, Obama did nothing.
Unlike Obama, Biden has only set red lines with Israel. Even after Oct. 7, he refrained from threatening Iran with anything concrete—even as Iranian proxies battered U.S. troops throughout the region. Before Iran attacked Israel in April, Biden said “don’t.” After they attacked, not only did he take no action, but he pressured Israel not to respond forcefully. In the wake of Israel’s response to the Iranian missile barrage in early October, Harris has said that an Iranian response would be “a strategic mistake” without threatening concrete action. Days later, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei threatened a “crushing response” against both Israel and the United States and reportedly ordered a reprisal strike.
Indeed, instead of threatening or punishing Iran, Biden has urged de-escalation and ceasefires ad nauseam. Harris has taken a similar approach. If Israel had listened to either, the senior leadership of Hamas and Hezbollah would be alive and Iran’s power projection would be as strong as it was before Oct. 7. Instead, Israel has decimated Hamas and turned Hezbollah—previously Iran’s greatest regional asset—into a chicken running around without its head. Beside the destruction of the entire senior leadership of the terrorist group, Israel has reportedly destroyed 80 percent of its feared rocket arsenal.
Israel’s military successes against Iran’s most powerful proxy raise the question – is Iran really so formidable? While it excels at irregular warfare, it is a country with a weak military, economy in shambles, a lack of allies and porous borders. The regime is so unpopular that its own population wants a Trump victory because they believe he’d be harder on Tehran. So why is the administration appeasing the regime?
Likely because the Democratic establishment believes that a hard stance would lead to Washington embroiled in another Middle East war, unable to refocus on China, Russia and other strategic threats.
But to completely shift focus away from the region is impossible without handing it over to Iran. Washington should instead empower its allies, helping them create a self-sufficient, tolerant, and prosperous region.
Joseph Epstein is the director for legislative affairs at the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET), a fellow at the Yorktown Institute, and a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.